The specific policy objectives of the common commercial policy according to Article 206 TFEU continue to be the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and lowering of customs and other barriers. In addition, Article 206 TFEU introduces the abolition of restrictions on foreign direct investment as a further objective which was not part of Article 131(1) TEC. This reflects the extension of the scope of the common commercial policy to foreign direct investment according to Article 207(1) TFEU. 14 The objectives of Article 206 TFEU refer to trade liberalization, but they do not indicate a free trade policy. Instead, the wording indicates that the process of trade liberalization shall be a gradual one. 15 In this respect, the objectives of Article 206 TFEU resemble the objectives of the world trading system. Whether or not a tariff or market access commitment can be withdrawn or modified is not a question to be answered on the basis of Article 206 TFEU, but by the respective rules of the World Trade Organisation in particular Article XXVIII GATT and Article XXI GATS. In any case, all trade measures, be they liberalising or not, must be scrutinised on the basis of the general external policy objectives and principles.
General external policy objectives and principles
The Treaty of Lisbon significantly increased the objectives and principles of the common commercial policy by submitting it to the general external policy objectives and principles. These principles and objectives can be found in Article 21 TEU. They include, 'democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, equality and solidarity, and respect for the United Nations Charter and international law.' Furthermore, according to Article 21(2) TEU the Union shall define and pursue common policies inter alia in order to, 'foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty, encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development.' 20 Cremona (n 2 above) 1363 also highlights the significance of this addition to the provisions on the common commercial policy.
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Dimopoulos (n 4 above) 165 ('mandatory nature').
7
These goals reflect and reinforce the general objectives of the Union's relations with the "wider world" according to Article 3(5) TEU.
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It should be noted that both Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU contain references to classical trade policy objectives: Article 3(5) TFEU refers to "free and fair" trade and Article 21 TFEU calls for an encouragement of the integration of all countries into the world economy which shall be achieved inter alia 'through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade'. It is therefore clear that the general obligations and principles of the external policy do not abandon or supersede gradual trade liberalisation as an objective. However, it is equally clear that the common commercial policy should not only aim at gradual liberalisation of trade, but also non-economic policy objectives, such as human rights, equality and solidarity, sustainable development and the preservation and improvement of the quality of the environment.
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Articles 205 and 207(1) TFEU explicitly require the common commercial policy to contribute to these objectives rather than to simply focus on the reduction of barriers to trade. By placing the common commercial policy into the larger framework of such policy goals, the Lisbon Treaty deviates substantially from previous reforms of trade policy through the Amsterdam and Nice treaties.
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Submitting the common commercial policy to the general external policy objectives and principles may have practical implications: As the pursuance of the goals mentioned in Article 21 TEU through the common commercial policy is a binding obligation, the Union's organs will have to consider them in the formulation and implementation of the EU's external 22 This provision states, 'In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.' This could be supported by the requirement of environmental, social and development impact assessments of all trade agreements and unilateral measures. It could also be argued that trade relationships with countries which openly reject the principles mentioned in para. 1 of Article 21 TEU (democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, principles of the United Nations Charter and international law) would require specific justifications and an explanation why these relations would not further harm the pursuance of those principles on a global level.
Binding the common commercial policy to the general goals and objectives of the Union's external policies has been criticised in the literature because it would lead to a 'politicisation' of trade policy. 
IV. Competences
The nature and scope of the Community's (now Union's) competence with regard to the common commercial policy has been a 'constitutional construction site' of growing 10 complexity since the early days of the European Economic Community.
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The Treaty of Lisbon clarifies some of the pertinent and disputed issues, but also raises new questions.
Exclusive nature
Article 3(1)(e) TFEU explicitly holds that the Union shall have exclusive competence in the area of the common commercial policy. This codifies the ECJ's case law 27 which has consistently held that the Member States do not have the power to enter into international agreements or legislate on matters of the common commercial policy.
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According to Article 2(1) TFEU, exclusive competence means that only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts. Member States can only do so if they have been empowered by the Union or when they implement Union Acts. According to Article 3(2) TFEU the exclusive competence also includes the conclusion of an international agreement 'when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.'
Similarly, Article 216(1) TFEU holds that the Union may conclude international agreements 'where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope'. Both provisions are based on the ECJ's doctrine on implied external powers. doctrine, the Union not only enjoys external powers if and insofar as the treaties explicitly confer such powers, but also implicit powers, which follow from internal competences.
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The three alternatives of Articles 3(2) and 216(1) TFEU are based on different aspects of the implied powers doctrine.
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The first alternative, ie the conclusion of an agreement which is provided for in a legislative Act of the Union seems to be taken from Opinion 1/94 32 , the second alternative, ie the conclusion is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, can be traced to Opinion 1/76 33 and the third alternative, ie the conclusion of an agreement may affect common rules or alter their scope, is taken from the AETR judgement. 
Scope
The first sentence of Article 207(1) TFEU holds that the scope of the common commercial policy includes trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property as well as foreign direct investment.
a) Policy instruments
The common commercial policy traditionally comprises an autonomous and an international policy dimension. The former employs internal EU legislation regulating trade while the later concerning agreements relating to trade in cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human health services which was contained in Article 133 (6) subparagraph 2 TEC.
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The only remains of this sectoral carve-out is the third subparagraph of Article 207(4) TFEU, which requires unanimity in the Council for the conclusion of trade agreements concerning these services in particular circumstances. It also affects the democratic legitimacy of the common commercial policy, because national parliaments are no longer responsible for the ratification of trade agreements which would (also) cover these services.
c) Commercial aspects of intellectual property
The scope of the common commercial policy concerning intellectual property rights remains restricted to the 'commercial aspects' of these rights. Article 207 TFEU keeps the term 'commercial aspects of intellectual property', which has no direct equivalent in international trade law: The relevant WTO's agreement refers to trade-related aspects of these rights.
39
While there is a general agreement that the linguistic difference between commercial aspects and trade-related aspects is not of great significance and that the term commercial aspects of intellectual property rights refers to the WTO's TRIPS agreement, the nature of this reference has been disputed. Some commentators have argued that the reference is a dynamic one which would also include changes in the TRIPS agreement. 40 Others have held that the reference is Krenzler and Pitschas (n 6 above) 302. static, linking the common commercial policy to the TRIPS at the time of its conclusion while any changes would require the exercise of a special competence in Article 133(7) TEC. 41 According to this provision, the Council was empowered to extend the application of the common commercial policy to international agreements on intellectual property in so far as they were not covered by the common commercial policy yet. The Lisbon Treaty abandoned this possibility. This has two implications: first, the Council can no longer enlarge the scope of the common commercial policy to non-commercial aspects of intellectual property. Second, if one assumes that the reference to commercial aspects of intellectual property is a static one, the abolishment of Article 133(7) TEC would deprive the Union of the possibility to negotiate and conclude changes in the TRIPS agreement. This would lead to a reduction of the scope of the common commercial policy which was not intended by the drafters of Lisbon (and Constitution) Treaty.
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It is therefore more appropriate to assume that Article 207 TFEU contains a dynamic reference to the TRIPS agreement. In conclusion, the Treaty of Lisbon extends the exclusive competence of the European Union to all three "pillars" of the WTO (trade in goods, trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights).
d) Foreign direct investment
While the increase and clarification of the scope of the common commercial policy regarding trade issues has not been subject to much political or academic controversy, the extension of the common commercial policy to foreign direct investment attracted considerable scholarly 41 Cremona (n 39 above) 72; Hermann (n 6 above) 18-19. 42 Krajewski (n 7 above) 111. This leads to a split of the competence to negotiate and conclude investment agreements. The Union is exclusively competent concerning those aspects of the agreement which relate to foreign direct investment, the Member States remain competent concerning portfolio investments. The practical consequence is that all investment agreements which cover both aspects of investment need to be concluded as mixed agreements.
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Another even more controversial issue concerns the substantive scope of the competence regarding foreign direct investment. The Member States would lose the competence to determine the scope, contents and partners of these agreements if the common commercial policy is understood to include investment protection.
It is submitted that the extension of the common commercial policy to foreign direct investment could and should be read more narrowly only referring to those aspects of foreign direct investment which concern investment liberalisation and those which have a close link to trade. While it is true that the absence of international standards of investment protection may deter foreign investors, the notion of 56 Dimopoulos (n 44 above) 371.
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A similar view is proposed by Ceyssens (n 44 above) 279-281, who wants to exclude expropriation and standards of protection on the basis of the limitation of competences now laid down in Article 207(6) TFEU, but maintains that the scope of the common commercial policy is not limited to market access issues, ibid, at 286. On Article 207(6) see below 3. 58 Krajewski (n 7 above) 114; Leczykiewicz (n 27 above) 1678.
'restrictions' relates to restrictive measures and not to an investment-unfriendly environment.
59
It should also be noted that the term 'foreign direct investment' is not a term of international investment protection law. It is typically not used in bilateral investment treaties.
If the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty wanted to confer the competence to conclude typical investment protection agreements to the Union why did they use the limited concept of foreign direct investment which would not give the Union the competence to conclude a single bilateral investment treaty on its own?
The negotiating history of the inclusion of foreign direct investment in the common commercial policy also supports a more narrow reading. As the inclusion was already part of This also supports the view that the proponents of the inclusion of foreign direct investment in the common commercial policy were predominantly concerned with the EC's negotiating mandate in the WTO and were not necessarily thinking about bilateral investment treaties concluded by the EU.
Limitations of the exercise of competences
62
Proposal by Mr Hain contained in the compilation of amendments (n 61 above). Articles 4(1) and 5(1) and (2) However, the Union may not implement such an agreement if these agreements would require harmonisation measures, because the Union lacks the competence to harmonise in these areas.
Consequently, the Union's external competence ('treaty-making') may extend beyond the scope of its internal competence ('treaty-implementing').
Such an incongruence between internal and external competences would not be a deviation from the AETR doctrine and its codification in Article 3(2) TFEU because this doctrine only provides for parallel competences if an internal competence exists. It does not affect the 65 Wouters, Coppens and De Meester (n 1 above) 174; Cremona (n 29 above) 32.
possibility that an external competence can exist without a parallel internal competence. In fact, the ECJ mentioned the possibility of an incongruence between external and internal competences in Opinion 1/75 ('Local costs') when it held that it was without prejudice to the treaty-making powers of the EC if the implementation of the agreement were to be the responsibility of the Member States. 66 An incongruence of external and internal competences is not uncommon in federal systems. Often the federation has an all-inclusive competence to conclude international agreements, but cannot implement them as long as the relevant legislative power rests with the states.
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As a consequence, the federation has to consult the states before it concludes an agreement which requires implementation by them. A similar requirement of the Union to consult the Member States before the conclusion of an agreement which requires implementation by the Member States could be based on the principle of sincere cooperation between Union and Member States which is expressively laid down in Article 4(3) TEU.
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This particular consequence of Article 207(6) TFEU can be seen as a step towards further 'federalization' of the Union's external relations. Instead of only 'centralizing' additional external powers at the Union level, the Lisbon Treaty requires policy co-ordination and cooperation at different government levels. Such policy co-ordination and co-operation is a typical elements of federal systems in which the central level is competent to act externally, but does not have the internal competence to legislate in all matters and therefore depends on the sub-central units of the system (provinces, cantons, Länder, etc.) to implement international agreements.
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Local Costs [1975] ECR 1355, (n 9 above) 1364.
67
See Krajewski (n 7 above) 117-118.
68
On the principle of cooperation concerning international agreements see also ECJ, Opinion 2/00 [2001] ECR I-9756, para 8 with further references to the case law.
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V. Institutions
The central reforms of the common commercial policy regarding institutional matters concern the decision-making in the Council (qualified majority voting/ unanimity) and the role and powers of the European Parliament. The Lisbon Treaty introduced smaller amendments regarding the former and major changes regarding the latter.
Decision-making in the Council
Article 207(4) TFEU holds that the Council should decide by qualified majority voting regarding the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements. This rule already existed before the Lisbon Treaty. Subparagraphs 2 and 3 of Article 207(4) TFEU contain exceptions from this principle.
Article 207(4) subparagraph 2 TFEU requires unanimity for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements regarding trade in services, commercial aspects of intellectual property and foreign direct investment 'where such agreements include provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules.' This provision applies the principle of parallelism to the decision-making in the Council: the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements shall be governed by the same majority requirements as internal legislation with the same content. This reflects the sensitivity of services and foreign direct investment for national regulatory autonomy and shows that the Member States were reluctant to lose the control over international agreements in this field. However, unanimity in the Council with regard to services and investment agreements is only required if respective internal legislation also needs to be adopted by a unanimous Council. If the Council can adopt legislation by qualified majority, it can also conclude international agreements in the same way.
Subparagraph 3 of Article 207(4) TFEU requires unanimity in the Council for the conclusion of agreements in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where these risk prejudicing the Union's cultural and linguistic diversity and in the field of trade in social, education and health services, where these risk seriously disturbing the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibility of Member States to deliver them. This provision raises a number of questions. At the outset it should be noted that it only covers the conclusion of agreements, and not the negotiation, which distinguishes it from subparagraphs 1 and 2. Hence, the negotiating process will not be influenced by the unanimity rule of subparagraph 3. Another aspect of the scope of subparagraph 3 concerns its sectoral coverage, which could be determined on the basis of the standard classification of services (CPC) used by the WTO. . Audiovisual services include motion picture and video tape production and distribution services and television and radio production and transmission services. Cultural services include a variety of services broadly associated with literature, art, music and history, such as museums, archives and theatre services. Education services include primary, secondary, higher and adult education. Health services include hospital services, and possibly also medical services of doctors, nurses, midwives and physiotherapists, which are actually considered professional services. Social services are not further specified in the WTO classification, but could include social work, care and community services. Arguably, these interpretative uncertainties could render subparagraph 3 nonoperational. As a consequence the Council could either decide to conclude all agreements involving audiovisual, cultural, health and education services by unanimous vote in order to avoid risking a violation of the voting requirements or Member States could refrain from invoking subparagraph 3 in the first place. The actual practice will most likely depend more on the political context of the issues concerned and less on legal niceties.
In any event, a trade agreement which includes issues requiring unanimity and issues requiring only a qualified majority will be concluded in its entirety by unanimous vote in the 70 Leal-Arcas (n 3 above) 31-32; Krenzler and Pitschas (n 64 above) 808.
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Krenzler and Pitschas (n 64 above) 808.
This could in particular be the case for agreements concluding future rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, which typically include a large variety of subjects.
Role and function of the European Parliament
The Lisbon Treaty significantly enhanced the role and the function of the European Parliament in the field of the common commercial policy. One commentator even argued that the increased importance of the parliament is the most important change of the common commercial policy.
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The role of the parliament has been modified regarding the negotiations, required'. Hence, whenever an international agreement covers an area, to which the ordinary legislative procedure applies, its conclusion requires the consent of the European Parliament.
As mentioned, Article 207(2) TFEU requires the establishment of the framework for implementing the common commercial policy in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. The European Parliament is hence not only a co-legislator for the implementation of international agreements, but also needs to give its consent to the conclusion of the agreement.
It is therefore safe to assume that the European Parliament's consent is required for the conclusion all international agreements which need to be implemented in accordance with the provision of Article 207(2) TFEU. 77 However, this does not answer the question whether the Parliament's consent is required for agreements which do not need to be implemented because they do not contain any requirements which need to be transformed into domestic law. For example, changes in the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) would not need to be implemented domestically because the DSU is only applicable at the international level. It could therefore be argued that Article 207(2) TFEU does not apply to changes of the provisions of the DSU. As a consequence, parliamentary consent for the conclusion of an international agreement changing provisions of the DSU would not be necessary. Therefore, if such an agreement would be concluded independently of the results of the other current WTO negotiations, it is possible that the European Parliament's consent would not be necessary.
However, since Article 218 TFEU would abandon the exception for trade agreements from the general consultation requirement, the European Parliament would need to be consulted.
The new requirement of parliamentary consent to the conclusion of international agreements is an improvement from the perspective of democratic legitimacy and ought to be welcomed. The limitation of this right to agreements which need implementation in internal 77 Grave (n 29 above) 108; Wouters, Coppens and De Meester (n 1 above) 185; Cremona (n 29 above) 15. law is disappointing, but may not be too significant in practice. In any case, the requirement of parliamentary consent will strengthen the European Parliament's influence in the negotiation process of international agreements, which is arguably just as important as the right to accept or reject an agreement.
When assessing the overall level of democratic legitimacy of external trade policy according to the Lisbon Treaty, it must be remembered that all areas of trade policy fall into the exclusive competence of the Union. Hence, Member States' parliaments are no longer required to ratify trade agreements. 
VI. Conclusion
The Lisbon Treaty changed the constitutional law of the common commercial policy in a number of important aspects. Overall, it can be concluded that these changes make the Union's external trade policy more federal, but not necessarily more democratic. The Union gained a comprehensive external competence which covers all fields of the current multilateral trading system. The extent of the Union's competences regarding foreign investment remains disputed: Against an apparent academic and political consensus that the See also Woolcock (n 73 above) 5, who points out that the parliamentary scrutiny of the Member States parliament has not been very effective in practice.
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Union is competent to conclude investment protection agreements, this chapter claimed that contextual, teleological and historic arguments support a more narrow view.
It has also been shown that Article 207 TFEU does not provide the Union with full internal competence to adopt legislation to implement respective agreements. Hence, the Union needs to co-ordinate with the Member States before such an agreement can be concluded. This is a situation which can be found in many federal systems and is therefore neither unusual nor impractical. The co-ordination between Union and Member States is facilitated by the fact that a number of issues still require unanimity in the Council. Many of those issues which require unanimity in the Council for the conclusion of an international agreement are also the issues for which the Union does not have internal competence. Therefore, the voting rules require co-ordination and a common accord of the Member States in matters where the internal competence of the Union is limited.
The necessity to implement an international agreement of the Union will nevertheless put political pressure on the Member States to adopt the relevant legislation. The formal competence of the Member States to implement an international agreement may in fact not leave the Member States a large margin of discretion.
The Lisbon Treaty increased the rights of the European Parliament regarding the conclusion of trade agreements. However, this improvement is partly outweighed by the fact that the national parliaments lost the right to ratify trade agreements which minimized their influence on external trade policy. The Lisbon Treaty therefore repaired some democratic defects of the previous constitutional law of the common commercial policy, but also introduced new problems.
